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Abstract
The article echoes stories and perceptions of the hosts to
the refugees in their day-to-day relations in Kakuma refu-
gee camp with little emphasis on academic abstraction of
refugee protection contained in international instruments
but rather on the realities on the ground. It is argued that
good refugee-host relations enhance refugees’ enjoyment
of their rights under the international conventions and
promote local integration. The article discusses areas of
conflict between refugees and their hosts and how these
factors endanger refugees’ physical protection, and it ech-
oes the hosts’ solutions to the conflicts. The failure of local in-
tegration is attributed to poor refugee-host relations.
Consequently, it is argued that even the enactment of refugee-
specific legislation “that would give force” to the interna-
tional conventions will not necessarily improve refugees’
enjoyment of their rights as long as, through a practice of
selective compassion by humanitarian agencies and inter-
national refugee law, refugees are targeted for assistance
without regard to the negative impact on the local econ-
omy and its residents.
Résumé
Cet article rapporte des récits et des perceptions émanant
des hôtes vis-à-vis des réfugiés dans leurs relations
quotidiennes dans le camp de réfugiés de Kakuma. Il fait
peu de cas des dispositions théoriques en matière de pro-
tection de réfugiés contenues dans les instruments inter-
nationaux, mais considère plutôt la réalité sur le terrain.
Il fait valoir que de bonnes relations entre réfugiés et
hôtes augmentent la capacité des réfugiés de se prévaloir
des droits que leur confèrent les conventions internation-
ales et facilitent l’intégration au niveau local. L’article ex-
amine les zones de conflit entre réfugiés et hôtes et aussi
comment ces facteurs constituent un danger à la protec-
tion physique des réfugiés. Il relate aussi les solutions que
les hôtes proposent à ces conflits. L’échec de l’intégration
locale est attribué aux mauvaises relations entre réfugiés
et hôtes. Par conséquent, l’article soutient que même la
promulgation d’une loi rendant exécutoire les conven-
tions internationales sur les réfugiés ne permettra pas
nécessairement à ces derniers de mieux jouir de leurs
droits. Selon l’article, ce phénomène durera tant que les
agences humanitaires et le droit international des
réfugiés pratiquent une « compassion sélective », ciblant
les réfugiés pour les assister, mais sans tenir compte de
l’impact négatif que cela peut avoir sur l’économie locale
et ses habitants.
It is better to be a refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma.1
Introduction
B
etween 1991 and 1998, the civil wars in the Horn and
the Great Lakes region of Africa brought ten nation-
alities to live among a people in Turkana District,
Kenya, so impoverished that the refugees came to be seen as
a threat. The region experienced an unprecedented wave of
refugee flows, resulting in large concentrations not only of
refugees, but also of hundreds of thousands of displaced
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peasants, agro-pastoralists, urban dwellers, and militias.
This escalated in the 1999–2001 civil and political unrest in
the DRC and Sudan, the recent election violence in the
islands of Pemba and Zanzibar,2 and the continued insur-
gence in northern Ugandan by the Lord Resistance Army
(LRA). The flight of these people poses problems that have
far-reaching consequences for the host country, the region,
and individuals.
This article focuses on the exiles’ reception in Kakuma
refugee camp, not by UNHCR or the government, but by
the local tribe, the Turkana (hereinafter, the hosts). In the
first part, it briefly introduces Kakuma, the hosts, and the
refugees. Secondly, the areas of conflict are discussed.
Thirdly, and in view of the context, it poses the question
whether local integration as a durable solution could be
realized. Fourthly, the possible impact of refugee-specific
legislation, if any, is analyzed. In conclusion, the future of
Kakuma refugee camp in its protracted state is contemplated.
The article relies on fieldwork observations; formal and
informal meetings with the hosts, refugees, and NGOs;
situational reports and the hosts’ correspondence to
UNHCR and her Implementing partners (IPs); and their
local MP, as well as personal experience. The discourse
adopts narratives from the hosts’ perspective, through
which they raise challenging questions to the international
principle of refugee protection, and their views render
Kenya as the receiving state unpopular among its people.3
The time frame for the observation is slightly over two
years, including input from two recent three-month field
visits, as part of a doctoral thesis.4
1. The Kakuma Refugee Camp, the Hosts, and 
 the Refugees
Kakuma refugee camp is located in Turkana district, one of
the remotest parts of Kenya. The temperature averages 40oC.
“Nothing” grows agriculturally in Kakuma. The area and its
residents are afflicted by famines, droughts, and severe eco-
nomic setbacks, making it impossible for them to eke out a
minimum living.
The camp was established in 1992 owing to the plight of
about 30,000 to 40,000 Sudanese “walking boys” or “lost
boys” who were forcefully returned to Sudan when the
Ethiopian regime of Mengistu was toppled in 1991. The
“boys” walked in the wilderness and wandered into Kenya.5
The camp has urban refugees from Burundi, Rwanda, and
Ethiopia as well as pastoralist refugees of Sudanese, Somali,
Ugandan, and Ethiopian origin.
The high refugee population forced the Government of
Kenya (GoK) to adopt the encampment policy, which
brought together approximately 60,000 Sudanese with
about 7,000 Ethiopians and Eritreans (with the recent
Ethiopia-Eritrea political instability, their numbers have
increased). Rwandans and Burundians are about 300 with
the majority living in the urban areas of Nairobi. There are
295 Ugandans and 243 Congolese.6 The Somali, including
the Somali-Bantu, are about 10,000 with an increase since
the closure of the Mombasa camps, forcing UNHCR to
relocate most refugees to Kakuma,7 and the insecurity in the
Dadaab camps.8 The increase necessitated the creation of
Kakuma II and III to accommodate the newcomers and
those who passed status determination interviews in Nai-
robi, as well as new arrivals from Sudan, Ethiopia, and
Eritrea. The exact population of refugees in Kenya is un-
known. UNHCR gives a figure of those living in the camp
only and an estimate of about 100,000 living in the urban
centres in Kenya.
The hosts are nomadic pastoralists who depend on cattle
for their survival. They are among the 43 per cent of Kenya’s
population that live in absolute poverty and their basic
needs have remained unmet for decades. They, inter alia,
depend on missionary aid for education and health. In
Kakuma, one notices the almost complete absence of the
GoK save for the police post, which was constructed by the
UNHCR to protect refugees from alleged hostilities of their
hosts, and the District Officer (DO) who mainly signs travel
documents (TDs) for refugees temporarily leaving the
camp.
Turkana district is evidently marginalized in develop-
mental terms. Its inhabitants are an ethnic minority who
are under-represented politically with limited economic
resources. They are debilitated by diseases, and for a long
time have been displaced through conflicts with their
neighbours, the Pokot, Karamojong, etc. It is among these
people that the GoK has created the oldest refugee camp
with UNHCR administering humanitarian assistance
among the refugees. The camp provides a locality for grow-
ing social conflict, economic decline, and political abuse,
which has often frustrated the refugee protection ideal. The
impact of refugees in Kakuma cannot therefore be under-
estimated. It has culminated in the hosts’ grievances, which
are motivated by unequal treatment by both the national
and international regime of refugee protection. Their de-
mands raise fundamental and conceptual issues, which
question the tenets of humanitarianism and equality in
human rights protection.
In contrast refugees receive free services including shel-
ter, food, firewood, and health care, which have created a
social, economic, and psychological imbalance. The popu-
lation of over 83,000 refugees is pitted against 10,000 local
hosts. As beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, refugees
are better off than their hosts. The problems faced by the
hosts are similar to those that caused the flight of refugees.
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The hosts mirror the problems common between them and
refugees. Yet the hosts cannot benefit from refugee aid due
to the intricacies of refugee law that someone must be
outside his country of origin and without the protection of
that state.9 This has led to the criticism that “international
aid can offer nothing better than the bleakness of the settle-
ments and camps while the generosity of the poor in host
countries can do no more than share their poverty.”10 It
would thus appear self-defeating to “better” refugees’ lives
in an environment afflicted by the same problems that
forced them to leave their countries.
The commonality of problems between refugees and
hosts raises doubts whether the refugee in Kakuma is the
one described in the conventions11 with the expanded defi-
nition in article 1 (2) of the OAU Convention that applies
the term “refugee”
...to every person who owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to
seek refuge...
The term “refugee” has therefore become a term of art
“with a content verifiable according to principles of general
international law.”12 The definition becomes problematic
due to circumstances that exist in Kakuma. The hosts’
history of displacement meets the expanded UNHCR man-
date for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). It is arguable
that the hosts could meet the criteria of refugees under the
OAU Convention and any attempt at selective protection
defeats the principles of human rights protection.
International refugee law as a concept is limited, which
explains why “economic refugees” are not considered.13
Due to the dilemma presented by economic refugees, States
have insisted on restrictive criteria for identifying those who
benefit from refugee protection. However, in Kenya most
refugees – Somalis, Sudanese, and Congolese – are recog-
nized prima facie, which casts doubt on their statuses. In
fact 99 per cent of refugees in Kakuma have not undergone
refugee status determination procedures (RSD). This situ-
ation is engendered by the presence of victims of natural
calamities and generalized violence.
Subsequently, refugee influx in Kakuma gives rise to
problems of a complex nature. The refugee is concerned
with personal survival and exploitation of available oppor-
tunities including those offered by the UNHCR. For the
world community, the problem, if recognized at all, is
perceived as a humanitarian issue to be forgotten as soon
as the pressing needs are partially satisfied. For the hosts, on
the other hand, it creates a complex series of problems,
including severe pressure on social services and infra-
structure.
The hosts find themselves in contact with foreigners who
fled their countries because of wars, poor economic situ-
ations, political persecution, and marginalization. The in-
tervention by UNHCR and GoK on behalf of refugees
cannot possibly be comprehended by the hosts because of
their own expectations; hence their many accusations,
which threaten refugee protection. In the hosts’ minds
linger the questions, why and how are refugees different
from them? Are the GoK and the international community
being selectively compassionate in humanitarian assis-
tance? Doesn’t that compromise humanitarian principles?
2. The Factors Affecting Refugee-Host Relations
The refugee-host relation remains a stumbling block. These
realities challenge the UNHCR’s mandate in providing “in-
ternational protection” and in seeking permanent solutions
to refugee problems. Humanitarian aid was exclusively
channeled to the refugees without regard to their hosts in
spite of the Daily Nation’s 1999–2000 wide report on the
Turkana famine that killed many. Refugee aid is not seen as
humanitarian but rather constructed as an economic gain
that guarantees life.
The imbalance is clearly pronounced when refugees re-
ceive humanitarian assistance, which enables them to sup-
plement their “incomes.” This has resulted in scapegoating,
which has often portrayed refugees as sources of political,
economic, social, and cultural problems.14 Refugees are
blamed for burdening an almost non-existent economy,
e.g., through local shopkeepers who complain that their
prices are regulated and taxed. In a letter to UNHCR, they
wanted refugees to leave the Kakuma area. However, after
they left, the hosts followed them to the camp because of
lower food prices, leading to a booming business in the
camp.
The hosts’ anxiety towards the refugees can be posed in
terms of a series of questions: Why do some people flee
while others who are in similar situations choose to stay?
What makes “aliens” special compared to other nationals
who opt not to flee despite facing the same circumstances?
This led to complaints attributed to the refugees’ presence
with specific complaints against UNHCR, IPs including
other NGOs, and the GoK. These factors were not com-
plained of before refugees arrived. Whereas there has been
a substantial administrative and infrastructural improve-
ment in the area owing to the refugees’ presence, the hosts’
summarily allege that since 1992 they have . . .
[e]xperienced problems caused by their habitation of our land
and which none of the previous UNHCR sub-office heads have
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bothered to address... we have observed that, the Turkana have
turned to be more poorer than the refugees.15
2.1. Insecurity, Crimes, and Refugee-to-Refugee Conflict
When the camp was established, the Turkana and the refu-
gees enjoyed good relations, which the Turkana say declined
later due to provocation by the Dinka refugees who were
“roaming around the villages without serious business,”
stealing, and causing unprovoked fights with the Turkana.16
Realizing that their hosts did not want the cutting of trees,
the Dinka formed groups that became a security threat,
which continued “massive felling of trees by well armed
gangs,” and are also accused of repeatedly raping Turkana
women.17 The murder of “innocent Turkana” topped the list
and on the same note the Turkana alleged that Dinkas
threatened to kill them before returning to Sudan.18 Turkana
elders revealed fears of “new” crimes, e.g., robbery with
violence, which have resulted in the increase of firearms that
was blamed on the Sudanese, Ethiopians, and Ugandans
who are close to their borders.
The hosts argued that criminals of Turkana origin now
collaborated with those of refugee origin. In distinguishing
theft of animals from traditional cattle rustling, the latter,
the hosts argue, guaranteed peaceful settlement because
whenever the cattle were identified, the “thief’” handed
them over to the bona fide owner. The situation has
changed, because the Ethiopian and Somali butchery own-
ers buy animals from the “owner” who is a Turkana, but
when another Turkana claims the animal that truly belongs
to him, conflict always ensues.
On the other hand, refugees argue that the practice of
cattle rustling by the Turkana is criminal, and that the
authorities have left it unpunished. The example is given of
a refugee who buys a cow from a Turkana, who will then
come in the night to “take it away,” on the pretext of
“cattle-rustling.” To solve this problem, refugees are ad-
vised not to keep cattle, and asked to buy one only when
they want to slaughter it. A security committee chaired by
the DO was proposed and it became the Kakuma Elders
Consultative Committee, which was to oversee refugee-
host relations and to report any offenders to the Kenya
police. Alternatively, they proposed that UNHCR should
repatriate all the Dinka refugees.
The hosts perceive refugee-to-refugee conflict as paint-
ing a bad image. Their violence in the camp goes unpun-
ished,19 hence impunity is  perceived as  affecting
relationships because constant fights among the refugees
sometimes result in deaths. Since refugees disrupt the tran-
quility of the hosts’ environment, they are seen as a security
threat. Their political affiliation has characterized refugees’
internal social relations with conflicts, which has bearings
on refugees’ adjustment and integration in Kakuma. For
instance, the Dinka ethnic tribes, the Bor and the Bahrel-
gazal, always fight. Yet the two gang up against the Nuer
tribe. This conflict always reflected the political situation in
Sudan that arises from the support of either John Garang
or Riak Macher of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). On the other hand the Luo, a minority group, are
considered “outsiders” in the Sudanese community because
their political stand over the war in the Sudan is not clear.
Clanism among the Somali community is a source of
violence because some clans claim superiority over others.
The Somali-Bantu are segregated because of the stigma that
they were once “slaves” in Somalia. The Hutu and Tutsis,
the Oromo and the Ethiopian always suspect each other of
espionage, escalating their old hatred. According to Rwan-
dans, the real identity of each member is uncertain, i.e.
whether Hutu from Burundi or Rwanda and vice versa.
Generally, the Dinka are accused of claiming the ownership
of Kakuma refugee camp, and the chairman of the Sudanese
community of claiming to be the overall chairman of all
other refugees; and the hosts perceive insubordination
from both the refugees and the refugee agencies, which do
not see them as having a say in matters affecting their area.
The above situation has sparked hostilities, prompting the
hosts to brand the refugees “killers.” To the hosts and other
refugees, some elements, especially the SPLA supporters
among the Dinka tribe, say that Kakuma is but a resting and
recuperating place, portraying them as people not deserving
protection.
2.2. Water and Food Security
The population of Kakuma was small when water facilities
were constructed but shot up drastically when refugees set-
tled. The water lines were then overloaded because the gen-
erator pumping water was too small, while the only windmill
broke down, resulting in water shortage. This has resulted
in strict regulation of the supply, because of which conflicts
have ensued at the water collection points. The hosts argue
that their women are forced to travel long distances to fetch
water resulting in “chest pains and miscarriages.” The hosts
suggested that the existing windmill be repaired or a new one
be installed and a new solar-powered system be erected, and
that all boreholes be repaired and the old generator be
replaced with a powerful one.
Food insecurity is also blamed on refugees. As nomadic
pastoralists, the hosts who, together with their cattle, de-
pend on pasture and water for survival claim that in settled
areas like Kakuma, Kalobeyei, Letea, and Lopur the land has
already been destroyed by soil erosion caused by the pres-
ence of refugees. UNHCR was asked to dig four water dams
in Kakuma Division in areas with adequate grass but no
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water, so that the livestock can get water. Also, UNHCR was
asked to provide materials or technical assistance to curb
erosion.
2.3. Employment and Refugee Agencies’ Attitudes towards
Hosts
The attitude of some NGOs combined with the hosts’ outcry
over bias in employment is a setback to refugee protection
in Kakuma. The hosts argue that their land has lost the
natural capacity to sustain their means of livelihood because
of occupation and devastation by refugees, causing acri-
mony and agitation among the youth,20 resulting in Turkana
Environmental Resource Association (TERA) and Kakuma
Integrated Development Organization (KIDO), etc.
Employers allegedly favour “outsiders.” The hosts argue
that it is because all NGOs are headed by non-Turkana who
practice nepotism, tribalism, and favouritism, and sideline
them because of a stereotype that they are “primitive” and
unqualified. This thought seems to have been erroneously
borrowed by some commentators who ignore how relevant
the issue is in refugee protection, and instead write that:
Although 85 percent of jobs in the camp are supposedly reserved
for the local people, few of the Turkana are sufficiently qualified
for the better-paid posts. Those who do have the necessary
qualifications also tend to be highly politicized, something,
which has contributed to regular disputes over issues such as
recruitment, dismissals and promotions.21
With due respect to this view it is questionable why some
agencies prefer employees from a particular tribe. The hosts
perceive it as tribalism, a factor that predominates in almost
all aspects of relations among the forty-seven ethnicities in
Kenya. In fact the hosts contend that the few Turkana who
are employed have always been dismissed without reason
even with a contract of employment in force. Whenever the
responsible officers are confronted over this issue they shift
the blame to authorities in Nairobi. The hosts reveal that
even the subordinate staff employed at the camp are rela-
tives of senior officers. They simply ask: does one really need
a certificate qualification to sweep a compound or clean a
toilet?
The attitude of some IPs as well as that of UNHCR has
contributed adversely to the resentment of refugees by the
hosts. For example the International Rescue Committee
(IRC) was accused of “overtly abusing and offending the
local community in ways that left it with no alternative
except its exit from Kakuma within the shortest time pos-
sible.”22 In defense the NGOs stated that “as international
staff they are above local politics,” but they were reminded
that if it were not for the refugees, they would not be in
Kakuma, and that “anybody above local politics on our soil
should operate in the air.”23 Whereas it is understandable
that NGOs cannot participate in “local politics,” this does
not warrant disrespect and ignoring complaints that would
affect refugee protection.
A list of IRC employees as at March 1998 showed that out
of forty-nine employees, only ten were from the host com-
munity. Referring to this situation, the hosts say that ma-
jority of its staff are “air-lifted from Nairobi in the UNHCR
plane.” When the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)
handed over the management of the Kakuma hospital to
IRC, staff from the host community were summarily dis-
missed. Those who wanted their contracts renewed were, as
a precondition, forced to test for HIV/AIDS.
The NGOs were also accused of “racism” and being
insensitive to cultural values. The utterances of the heads of
IRC were described as being “heavily laden with racial
overtones typical of Ku Klux Klan ideology.”24 The hatred
of NGOs, in spite of being well documented, has not been
addressed, yet on the receiving end is the refugee, who
unknowingly mixes with the angry hosts.
The hosts requested that NGOs operating in Kakuma
give them priority in positions they are qualified in – listed
as co-ordinators, administrators, supervisors, etc. Sec-
ondly, jobs must be advertised and recruited in Kakuma
because they lack the resources to travel to and stay in
Nairobi. Thirdly, the practice of volunteer staff prior to
actual employment should be abolished because it arguably
contravenes accountability of funds of the organization, as
people worked as “volunteers” when they were actually
entitled to a salary. Lastly, all subordinate posts – watch-
men, cleaners, loaders, etc. – must “automatically be
granted to the locals.”
2.4. Supply Tenders
The hosts perceive the camp situation as presenting an
opportunity for the exploitation of the local economy. In
1992, the hosts supplied available commodities such as fire-
wood, makuti (thatch) for building, and meat. This changed
later with the introduction of competitive tendering and the
emergence of numerous non-existent groups, belonging to
non-Turkana and some “senior people.” This marked
TERA’s advocacy in favour of the hosts; the hosts were
denied a contract worth 32 million Kenya shillings for the
supply of firewood to the refugees.25
Therefore the exploitation of readily available local re-
sources became contentious because thatching materials
highly needed by the refugees, which are found at
Kalobeyei, 27 kilometers from Kakuma were now allegedly
“imported.” In response the tendering authorities argued
that the Turkana cannot deliver according to the terms of
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the tender and that is why suppliers were contracted from
Kitale, about 600 kilometers from the camp.
The hosts suggested that the criteria for tendering, espe-
cially for makuti  and meat, be clearly defined, and that their
local leaders like the chiefs be co-opted into the tendering
committee to avoid bias and “ghost groups.” Lastly, the
Turkana, being pastoralists, should be allowed and encour-
aged to supply meat and milk products since they have
plenty of livestock. It is logical to purchase poultry and
bacon products from elsewhere because they are not avail-
able in Kakuma.
2.5. Deforestation
Not only has deforestation catalyzed the refugee-host con-
flict, it has equally demeaned the respected “Nyayo philoso-
phy” of soil conservation, which is popularized in the rural
areas with the slogan “cut one, plant two.” The refugees cut
many and replace none. In Kenya the Chiefs and the DOs at
the lower levels and the District Commissioners (DCs) at the
higher levels portray that slogan of environmental conser-
vation as a presidential law, which it is an offence to disobey.
Government agents have in the past held weekly barazas
(meetings) on the impact of deforestation, but with the
refugees, they have become aloof and the hosts feel discrimi-
nated against in favour of the refugees.
The hosts are alarmed at the rate at which refugees cause
deforestation, as evidenced in Zone 7 of the camp, inhabited
by the Sudanese community. The hosts say that the refu-
gees, when confronted, become violent and continue with
massive destruction of local tree species for cooking and
construction. Hence there are daily fights between the two
communities. Refugees are accused of destroying trees at
distances of up to 5 kilometers. The hosts argue that their
livestock largely depend on these trees, and deforestation
has exposed the topsoil to wind and water erosion. On the
other hand the hosts want to control the supply of firewood
and building materials as an economic gain, which is dis-
rupted by the refugees.
The hosts asked UNHCR to do two things: firstly, to
confine refugees to the camp and to provide them with
cooking and building materials; and secondly, to initiate
mass planting of trees, especially the local species, and to
employ some refugees as forest guards to avoid conflict.
2.6. Education
Since 1992, primary schools in the camp have increased to
twenty in number with five secondary schools. Comparing
to the period before the refugees’ arrival, the hosts construe
this increase to mean that the government favours the refu-
gees, with at least 20,000 refugee children attending school.
It is difficult for the hosts’ children to be admitted to the
schools in the camp, yet refugee children are admitted in
large numbers to schools run by the hosts, e.g., Lopur Pri-
mary School. This has arisen due to the questionable quality
of education in the camps and further because refugees,
particularly Somali and Sudanese, prefer the Kenyan educa-
tion system. In effect local schools lack facilities to accom-
modate the increase. Hence the hosts required UNHCR to
fence and provide water to the local schools as well as to
renovate classrooms, desks, and where necessary to provide
food, including establishing nutritional feeding centres. It
was again noted that the schools needed textbooks, chalk,
and pressure lamps for study. It was also suggested “pre-
school activities at village level be initiated."
2.7. Health
Although the hosts appreciate the health facilities extended
to them, they contend that poor sanitation in Kakuma is due
to lack of toilet facilities and the many refugees, which led to
bad sanitary conditions and the trading in commodities
whose suitability for human consumption was “highly sus-
pect.” The recent arrivals, Somali-Bantu, have been accused
of using the local wells on the river Tarach as “bathtubs,”
which has resulted in water-borne diseases such as typhoid,
bilharzia, and dysentery.
The Sudanese minors are accused of using the bed of the
river as a football pitch and a venue for “other social adven-
tures” and their prolonged presence in the riverbed results
in “pollution.” However, part of the blame is attributed to
the authorities concerned because they did not conduct
impact analysis to determine the extent to which the activi-
ties of the refugees would bring menace to their hosts and
the environment. The construction of latrines was sug-
gested as a solution.
2.8.  Cultural Erosion
In traditional Turkana, the sanctity of marriage was and still
is a treasured value. A bride could collect in dowry at least
thirty animals. Marriages were planned and celebrated in a
tradition that involved the two families. In violation of that
tradition there is an increasing untraditional elopement of
Turkana girls with refugees. Although elopement is not an
“alien” practice in Turkana, the expectation was that, once the
family of the girl “reclaimed” her, they would be accorded due
respect and negotiations for marriage would begin. This is
because often elopements initiated marriage proceedings.
Secondly, it demonstrated the groom’s intention to marry,
which was to spark a process of initiation and responsibility
in society. But refugees do not understand the above practice
and its importance to the Turkana who traditionally de-
manded dowry or pregnancy compensation. Refugees often
object on the grounds that they do not have the cows de-
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manded or they do not relate to the culture, and a dismissive
argument often has been that it is the girls who follow of their
own volition.
The elders confirmed the existence of another factor
causing girls to breach those traditional values: the duty to
fend for their impoverished families through those “mar-
riages.” Elders also blamed refugees for the growth of broth-
els and prostitution, resulting in venereal disease, which the
community argues is new.26
2.9. Local v. National Politics
What emerged shortly after refugees settled were boreholes,
schools, hospitals, a police station, and free food for refugees.
The question then arose as to whether the refugees were
taking over their land. This was followed by popular agita-
tion to oust the ruling party’s MP, as the hosts had lost faith
in the government, and in the 1997 general elections an
opposition candidate won. His triumph engendered a call
for the immediate departure of refugees from Kakuma.
Forty years after independence, the hosts are, because of
refugees, asking the government to give them basic rights,
inter alia, education, health, and employment.27 They ex-
press hatred of the government for generally sidelining
them in development. The political history has contributed
to the hosts’ problems, but the refugees’ presence has ex-
posed the gravity of their political marginalization. In a
letter, the hosts were grateful to the new MP for rescuing
them from “bondage of intimidation, oppression, depres-
sion, abuses, harassment and insubordination.”28 The MP
was asked to influence the employment of the hosts in both
the government and the NGO sector, to promote educa-
tion, and to influence the development of infrastructure.
The hosts’ resentment of the government was high-
lighted during the creation of Kakuma II. The negotiation
involved the government and UNHCR officials excluding
the villagers. This elicited problems from two fronts. From
the legal perspective, Turkana District is designated as fall-
ing under customary law, and therefore the taking away of
that land without consulting the owners was unconstitu-
tional.29 Secondly, the extension of this camp sparked dis-
agreement because the Turkana living in that area were
pushed further away from services already delivered in
Kakuma. This was seen as an act further marginalizing
them. The elders were intimidated and asked to obey the
government’s order because, it was argued, as a signatory
to international refugee law, Kenya was under an obligation
to host refugees. The elders further alleged that bribery was
used to influence some members of the committee.30
A proposal for compensation was suggested where the
twenty-six affected families of 477 people be provided don-
keys as means of migrating to other areas. Since these
families kept goats in the area, movement into more harsh
areas required the type of animals that could resist the new
environment. Hence they demanded camels and UNHCR
was asked to construct livestock watering holes at Lobokat
and Pelekech areas. Also they asked that the borehole at
Zone 7 of the camp be exclusively used by the hosts.
3. Is Local Integration Possible?
The short answer to this question is “no” because the above
factors inhibit its realization. The areas of conflict are inher-
ent in the following factors: First, the socio-cultural set-up
lacks the capacity to absorb the refugees. It rejects and
segregates them because refugees cannot participate in the
dominant culture of the hosts including their inability to
speak the local language. This is engendered by the hosts’
perceptions, the educational and occupational backgrounds
of the refugees and hosts, which are variables that determine
the speed, the direction, and the level of integration. But
these aspects are in conflict in Kakuma.
Secondly, refugees in Kakuma, like their hosts, are vul-
nerable to marginalization.31 Economically, they are both
inhibited from participating in the productive system, de-
nying individuals the use of “his ideas, his talents, his hopes
upon the community that has admitted him.”32 They would
only achieve integration when as migrants they
…become a working part of their adopted Society, take on many
of its attitudes and behaviour patterns and participate freely in
its activities, but at the same time retain a measure of their
original cultural identity and ethnicity.33
But employment, which is usually a first step towards mean-
ingful integration, is unavailable. The employment of inter-
national and national staff in almost all areas creates an
unemployed population that continues to depend on hu-
manitarian aid.
Thirdly, refugees cannot participate in the political life of
their hosts.34 The practice in Kakuma, as you will often hear,
is that refugees shall not participate in the politics of the host
community, and shall not even question the attitude of
government agents towards them. The refugees may not
demonstrate even against their own embassies, because that
is considered “political” with respect to the host govern-
ment in spite of evidence that countries of origin interfere
with their asylum.35
Fourthly, the GoK’s encampment policy inhibits integra-
tion. Through numerous police roadblocks along the Kitale-
Lodwar-Kakuma-Lokichoggio roads, it restricts refugee
movement, giving rise to a chronic culture of corruption,
with refugees buying their way out of the camp. In Nairobi
refugees must carry identification documents all the time,
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which the police do not respect, hence the contradiction
that:
While unfailingly generous in giving asylum and relief to rural
refugees,…African Governments have been slow in promoting
real integration and slower with regard to naturalization. The
stringent security regulations in force ... in rural settlements
have also served to curtail integration.36
Lastly, the psychological state of the refugees also delays
integration because of self-denial for years that their exile
may be long or even permanent. The refugees “instead
…believe that their exile is temporary and that …a radical
change…will upset the status quo and enable them to re-
turn home.”37 The refugees in Kakuma are very disillu-
sioned that there will be an end to their exile, because just
when the situation seemed favourable for repatriation, con-
flicts always broke out such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict
of 1998-999, the DRC-Uganda-Rwanda war, the collapse of
the Sudan peace talks, and the Rwandan refugees’ belief that
genocide is still taking place.
The quest for integration in Kakuma is a process that
went through several stages, which are ideally peaceful,
exploratory, or even ignorant but later become competitive
and conflictual over scarce resources, with the end-game
being assimilation, integration, or segregation.38 How-
ever, Kakuma mirrors a situation where neither integra-
tion nor assimilation seems possible. Furthermore,
African societies are multi-ethnic and the recognition of
heterogeneity rather than assimilation of one group by
another is the modus vivendi, i.e., “live and let live" based on
tolerance of differences, solidarity, and positive integration.
In Kakuma, integration would mean a situation where hosts
and refugees coexist and share the same resources without
conflict.39
Integration, it has been suggested, must take into ac-
count causes of refugees’ maladjustment because flight
“desocializes" the individual when it uproots him. Social inte-
gration is, however, not only determined by host-society fac-
tors but also by the socio-cultural backgrounds of the
exiles.40 In Kakuma refugee life is marred by disruption and
abandonment of life goals, marriage is delayed; education
is discontinued and careers are given up. To that extent
integration becomes idealistic and in Kakuma can be summa-
rized as a failed policy. The situation is itself a “push-factor”
for repatriation. This difficulty therefore solicits for solu-
tions towards the refugee-hosts peaceful coexistence. One
suggestion would be the contribution of law with the hope
that the society where refugees live would respect the rule
of law and in its presence, it would protect refugees’ endeav-
our to integrate.
4. Domestic Legislation an Exercise in Futility?
Kenya acceded to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees (the 1951 Convention), its Protocol, and the
OAU Convention in 1963, 1982, and 1992 respectively.
Kenya also acceded to other human rights treaties including
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
accepting therefore to protect refugees. The legal definition
of a refugee in Kenya derives from these treaties. However,
pursuant to a dualist approach to international law, the
treaties have no direct effect in Kenya because they have not
been incorporated into the legal framework through an Act
of Parliament, without which refugees are presently at the
mercy of ad hoc policies.
Incorporation of treaties into Kenyan law would argu-
ably define the eligibility procedure and the authority re-
sponsible for granting asylum, check against detention,
police “swoops” and forceful repatriation as an existing
danger. Some refugees who are disillusioned by interna-
tional law are more concerned by the absence of Kenyan law
for their protection. Without legislation, refugees are vul-
nerable to abuse, their rights are violated by both the
authorities and their hosts, and they are used as scapegoats
for the GoK’s failures to the hosts.41 The current 2001
Refugee Draft Bill has considered this view. But it is not
clear how this law, if enacted, would reduce the refugees-
hosts tension. The earlier bills of 1991, 1994, 1998, and 1999
were never tabled in Parliament although the current Min-
ister promises to table the current one.42
To enhance good relations with the hosts, UNHCR it
seems has no choice but to redefine the refugee in Kakuma.
UNHCR could seriously consider the hosts as other groups
of persons who can be or presumed to be without or unable
to avail themselves of the protection of their government
(often called “displaced persons” or “persons of con-
cern”).43 By including the hosts in its assistance, UNHCR
would be complying with her humanitarian character; oth-
erwise Kenya’s enactment of a law to protect refugees would
be perceived as preference over her own people. After all, as
IDPs the hosts have no legal protection apart from mere UN
guidelines.44
However, refugees left their countries for reasons that
include, inter alia, the fear of anticipated danger, persecu-
tion, political opposition, forced labour, and economic
problems. Although the hosts experience some of these
problems, the difference is that the refugee has crossed an
international border to warrant assistance. Perhaps the re-
luctance by the Turkana to flee to neighbouring countries
is in itself a solution to the root causes of forced migration,
and the GoK should today grasp the challenge to address
the issue of insecurity and that of IDPs that predominates
in northwestern Kenya. These entire issues amount to the
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protection of human rights, so that the enactment of refu-
gee legislation will do very little, if anything at all, to better
refugee lives in the locality.
5. Conclusion
The importance of rethinking a modality for the implemen-
tation of humanitarian assistance where refugees reside is
emphasized.45 The UNHCR and the GoK have ignored the
importance of good refugee-host relations. The areas of
conflict demonstrate the hosts’ desire to be involved in
hosting refugees. Kakuma exposes the weaknesses of the
present refugee regime, especially the internal problems of
the host government vis-à-vis its nationals. Due to refugee
aid, the hosts resent their government because the refugees
offer them a yardstick. The hosts may arguably be wrong but
these are the realities that refugees face daily and not the
beauty of the Conventions. In fact whatever measures the
international community takes, one of them would be to
convince the hosts why refugees appear privileged in their
midst. It is debatable that the hosts’ claims may be unrea-
sonable but these issues challenge our daily protection of
refugees especially in Africa. The hosts’ perceptions are in
fact not any different from xenophobic and racial attitudes
in Western countries.
In particular, the following issues are emphasized:
Firstly, I have generally questioned the implications of pro-
tracted refugee camps and how they result in more prob-
lems for refugees. Perhaps the abolition of the camps would
ameliorate refugee suffering. Kakuma has proved that camp
policy is bad for various reasons. First, it directly violates
the fundamental freedoms of movement, among other
rights. Second, it discourages local integration, as refugees
are caged in the camps, which are inhabitable (in their
protracted state), yet the hosts are expected by the govern-
ment to live in Kakuma harmoniously with the refugees.46
Third, it encourages corruption, as refugees will always buy
their way out of the camp when there is need to travel.
Therefore whether refugees in Kakuma are better off than
their hosts depends on the perception of the refugee prob-
lem as being more than just flight of people across borders,
because a solution of their problem involves allocation of
scarce resources and services in the host environment.
Hence what makes life bearable in Kakuma is interpreted as
a common resource.
Secondly, the creation of camps among impoverished
and underdeveloped hosts challenges the application of
humanitarian aid and is entirely a problem of the govern-
ment that has discouraged peaceful coexistence as refugees
are “advantaged” over the hosts. The latter’s grievances rest
in the government’s failure to develop their region. De-
mand for compensation should therefore be directed at the
government and not the international community. Para-
doxically it appears that unless assistance considers the
needs of the poor hosts and contributes towards their de-
velopment, there is always the danger that refugees will be
blamed for the hosts’ problems. However, the hosts do not
care who the aid is for, because they too exist in the same
condition as the refugees, and naturally deserve assistance,
which if they are denied makes the refugees’ status better
than that of the host. Kakuma refugee camp therefore pre-
sents a dilemma where the hosts do menial jobs for the
refugees; they are house helps, “dishwashers,” and baby-sitters
for refugee children. The hosts therefore depend on the
refugees’ presence, and this makes them vulnerable to
abuse, especially when hunger bites.47
Thirdly, it is shown that the hosts “grab” the opportunity
to blame refugees and more specifically use the areas of
conflict as “scapegoating” tools. Ignorance also plays a
major role because the allegation and the hosts’ proposed
solutions sound rather naïve but the real danger is that the
protection ideal is far from realization. Governments have
an obligation to popularize the hosting of refugees among
their nationals. However, it is right to say that both objec-
tive and subjective reasons influence the refugee-host con-
flicts.
Fourthly, Kakuma is not conducive for the realization of
local integration, which is generally very low in Kenya. To
promote integration, refugee assistance should be planned
on “refugee affected areas” rather than establishing parallel
services in camps.48 The GoK should adopt a policy which
uses the available resources for the sustainability of both
refugees and their hosts. Assistance policies have encour-
aged the confinement of refugees in the camps, rendering
them dependent on relief.49 Hence the would-be host gov-
ernments want the guarantee of refugee aid before admit-
ting refugees.50 This image has portrayed the refugee as a
“problem” rather than as persons with problems, and as
such has obscured the reality that refugees are persons ready
to put their energies into productive work that could benefit
their hosts.
Alternatively, the GoK could adopt the two-tier approach,
proposed by the Centre for Development and Enterprise
(CDE) in South Africa where free movement of skilled
people from anywhere in the world is admitted, and sec-
ondly, the probationary entry of unskilled people who, once
they have satisfied a series of requirements, may in time
qualify for permanent residence and work rights.51 These
approaches would as a matter of necessity expedite the
desired East African Co-operation, through its new East
African Co-operation Ministry. Lastly, even refugee-specific
legislation would not be a definite solution to this pro-
tracted situation, but would provide a benchmark within
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the national level the absence of which disables interna-
tional refugee law.
If the authorities are serious in this region, they should
realize that refugees could help to expand the Great Lakes
economic “cake” because the region seriously needs to tap
skilled labour from all angles. The free movement of capital,
goods, and labour would ultimately promote the prosperity
of the region. This was the concern of the East African Law
Society conference on the “East Africa Court of Appeal and
Conflict Resolution.”52 This will promote respect for hu-
man rights and refugeeism in the region and perhaps prove
to governments that: “it is not only a bundle of belongings
that a refugee brings to his new country.”53
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